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Quantum communication with systems of dimension larger than two provides advantages in in-
formation processing tasks. Examples include higher rates of key distribution and random number
generation. The main disadvantage of using such multi-dimensional quantum systems is the in-
creased complexity of the experimental setup. Here, we analyze a not-so-obvious problem: the
relation between randomness certification and computational requirements of the postprocessing
of experimental data. In particular, we consider semi-device independent randomness certification
from an experiment using a four dimensional quantum system to violate the classical bound of a
random access code. Using state-of-the-art techniques, a smaller quantum violation requires more
computational power to demonstrate randomness, which at some point becomes impossible with
today’s computers although the randomness is (probably) still there. We show that by dedicating
more input settings of the experiment to randomness certification, then by more computational post-
processing of the experimental data which corresponds to a quantum violation, one may increase the
amount of certified randomness. Furthermore, we introduce a method that significantly lowers the
computational complexity of randomness certification. Our results show how more randomness can
be generated without altering the hardware and indicate a path for future semi-device independent
protocols to follow.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd
Randomness is an important concept that manifests it-
self in many fields of science including statistics, biology,
finance, informatics, social sciences and physics. Random
numbers have vast applications in e.g. statistical sam-
pling, Monte-Carlo simulations, cryptography and com-
pletely randomized designes. However, as John von Neu-
mann aptly put it: ”Any one who considers arithmetical
methods of producing random digits is, of course, in a
state of sin.” Since knowledge of the program governing
a software renders the output predictable, any such soft-
ware is limited to produce pseudorandom numbers. The
use of pseudorandom numbers in tasks which require gen-
uinly random numbers can lead to qualitative compro-
mises in the task performance e.g. security breaches in
cryptographic systems [1, 2].
However, in quantum theory genuine randomness is a
fundamental feature of the physical reality of quantum
systems. Therefore, hardware based on quantum sys-
tems were proposed for generation of random numbers
e.g. path-splitting of photons [3], the phase noise of a
laser [4, 5], radio active decay [6], Raman scattering [7],
and the arrival time of photons [8]. Yet, how can we
trust that the generated random numbers are not sub-
ject to some underlying predictability originating from
the construction of the hardware, i.e. how can we be
sure that the hardware is not just classically simulating
the quantum system? To resolve this issue, the notion
of device-independence [9] was developed in which no as-
sumptions are made on the inner workings of the hard-
ware. By exploiting quantum correlations violating Bell’s
inequality [10, 11] it was demonstrated that true random
number generation is possible, even if we do not trust
the supplier of our hardware [12]. Unfortunately, device-
independent protocols have strong requirements on their
devices which leads to very low number generation rates,
even with state-of-the-art technology. Semi-device inde-
pendent (SDI) protocols were proposed [13] as good com-
promise between security and efficiency. In an SDI pro-
tocol, the devices remain untrusted but an upper bound
on quantum channel capacity is assumed. This approach
can be used for true random number generation [14, 15]
and was also experimentally realized [16, 17].
In an SDI protocol, we have no knowledge of the pa-
rameters (states and measurement operators). Therefore,
to compute a lower bound on the amount of randomness
generated, we need to optimize over all parameter set-
tings that could reproduce the observed data, and then
choose the least random result. Unfortunately, the tar-
get function is a quadratic function of the parameters and
there are no known algorithms which guarantee to find a
ar
X
iv
:1
51
1.
05
79
1v
2 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
22
 Ju
n 2
01
6
2global minimum of such functions. This makes the opti-
mization highly non-trivial. The most common approach
is to use a semi-definite relaxation of the problem, i.e. op-
timize over a larger set such that it can be parameterized
by variables in which the target function is linear. The
first methods based on this idea were proposed in [18, 19].
Later they were replaced by a more efficient method from
[20]. In this paper we investigate the computational re-
quirements of these methods on postprocessing of exper-
imental data for randomness certification. We show that
there exists an interesting trade-off: the more computa-
tional power the user has to analyze the experimental
data, the lower are the requirements on the experimen-
tal setup serving as hardware for randomness generation.
Our results are both qualitative: a user with more com-
putational power can certify the existence of randomness
in a setup in which a user with less power cannot; and
quantitative: given the same setup, a user with more
computational power can certify more randomness. We
also show how to reduce the computational complexity
of randomness certification.
Our paper has the following structure. First, we de-
scribe SDI random number generation protocols. Then
we discuss the methods used for randomness certification.
Next we consider a particular quantum protocol, present
its experimental realization, and apply our methods to
analyze the experimental data. We conclude by a discus-
sion of our results.
Semi-device independent random number generation
protocols.— The structure of semi- or fully-device in-
dependent random number generation protocols is the
same. The experiment is divided into rounds. Some
rounds are chosen for security parameter estimation while
the rest are used for generation of randomness.
We divide the total number of rounds into many groups
of random size. In every group, the first round is used
for parameter estimation and all remaining rounds in the
group are used for randomness generation. Let X de-
note a set of all possible inputs the devices can have in a
round and X ′ its arbitrary subset. For every round used
for parameter estimation the inputs are randomly chosen
from X . An input is randomly taken from X ′ indepen-
dently for every group, and then used in all randomness
generation rounds within the respective group. In the
standard device-independent random number generation
protocols, X ′ consists of only one element i.e. the same
inputs are used for all randomness generation rounds [12].
Here we study a more general case. In fact, the number
of possible settings of an randomness generation round
(i.e. the number of elements in X ′), which we denote by
K, is the parameter of the protocol that is responsible
for both the computational complexity and the amount
of randomness generated.1
The idea behind the class of protocols presented above
is that if sufficiently many of the rounds are used for pa-
rameter estimation, e.g. O(√N), then, because this set
was chosen randomly, the average value of the param-
eter estimated for these rounds is close to the average
for the remaining rounds (see [12] for details). In fully
device independent protocols this parameter is the viola-
tion of some Bell inequality, whereas in SDI protocols it is
the efficiency of some communication game [21] in which
the amount of communication is restricted in accordance
with the known dimension of the quantum system which
is assumed in SDI protocols. In both cases we know that
values of these parameters imply lower bounds on the
average amount of randomness in the measurement out-
comes in each round. Our focus is the SDI approach in
which one part of the device (Alice) receives the input Z
from which she prepares a quantum state ρZ about which
we only know the Hilbert space dimension d (this is the
SDI assumption). ρZ is then sent to the other part of
the device (Bob) who recieves his input Y from which he
determines a measurement to perform on ρZ . The pair
X = (Z, Y ) constitutes what we previously have called
the input of the device in a given round. The result
of Bob’s measurement is denoted by B and the whole
procedure yields a corresponding conditional probability
distribution P (B = b|X = x). We use the following
quantity as security parameter which allows us to esti-
mate the randomness: T =
∑
b,x cb,xP (B = b|X = x).
Now we describe the methods which we can use to certify
randomness.
Randomness certification.— The randomness of the
variable B is quantified by conditional min-entropy, de-
fined as
H∞(B|X = x) = − log max
b
P (B = b|X = x). (1)
Our task is to find a lower bound on this quantity as a
function of the parameter T . To this end we use methods
from Ref. [20] based on semi-definite programming [22]
which are currently the state-of-the-art for this kind of
problems. However, these methods are only able to op-
timize target functions which are linear in probabilities,
which is not the case for − log max{·}. Since − log(·)
is a strictly decreasing function, finding its minimum is
equivalent to finding the maximum of the argument. The
max part can be managed by performing a separate max-
imization for all b and then choosing the largest value.
This would be sufficient if the same setting was chosen
for each round that is used for randomness generation.
1 Examples of protocols with K > 1 exist in literature, see e.g.
[29, 30] but they do not study the amount of randomness and
the complexity of its certification as a function of K.
3However, in the more general case we are interested in,
we have to use the average min-entropy2
Hav∞ (B|X) = −
1
K
∑
x∈X ′
log max
b
P (B = b|X = x). (2)
Again, we can deal with log(·) easily: using its concav-
ity we have Hav∞ (B|X) ≥ − log 1K
∑
x∈X ′ maxb P (B =
b|X = x) and thus we can focus on maximizing the ar-
gument. We should perform a separate maximization for
every value of b, but this time we have to choose a sepa-
rate value of b for every element of the sum. This implies
DK optimizations, where D is the number of possible
values of B. We see that the amount of computation
grows exponentially with K so we need a good reason
for choosing K > 1. Now, we will present a simple and
intuitive reason for taking K > 1, especially for protocols
in which systems of high dimension are communicated.
Later we show that our intuition is correct by considering
a particular example.
Let’s assume K = 1 and consider a device which in
Bob’s part uses the optimal measurements for reaching
the maximal value of T . The states for Alice are optimal
for all z apart from a particular one denoted z0. Alice’s
state ρz0 is an eigenvector of one of Bob’s measurements,
call it y0. The values of these inputs are chosen in such a
way that x0 = (z0, y0) is the only member of X ′ i.e. only
rounds with the input x0 are used for randomness gener-
ation. Obviously, in this case there is no randomness as
we can with certainty predict the measurement outcome.
This comes at a price of lowering the value of the elements
associated to x0 in the sum in T . However, all the other
elements still have the optimal quantum value and the
overall change to T is not significant. The impact of this
is particulary strong for high dimensions since the possi-
ble values of Z required for impossibility of achieving the
maximal quantum value of T with a classical protocol is
greater than d [23]. The more values of Z different from
z0, the less T is decreased by the procedure described.
It is easy to see why taking larger K should help. In
order to obtain no randomness for many different values
of X, more elements of the sum in T have to be below
the optimal value.
For example, if the devices use the strategy described
in the paragraph above, for the experiment that we de-
scribe in this paper, the critical value of T below which
no randomness can be generated is TK =
16−K
16
3
4 +
K
16
5
8 .
This value is obtained by noticing, that there are 16 pos-
sible inputs for Alice and if she sends the optimal state
2 We use this formula because, if it is later multiplied by the num-
ber of rounds, it represents log of the probability to guess the
whole set of outcomes B with the knowledge of the settings for
each round available. This is the quantity in which we are usually
interested when generating randomness.
the success probability is 34 , while if she sends the eigen-
vector of one of Bob’s measurements it is only 58 . For
K = 1 T1 ≈ 0.742 and we see that the lower bound for
larger K’s in fig.1 allows to certify the randomness for
this value of T . The same behaviour is seen for K = 2
and corresponding T2 ≈ 0.734. This clearly shows the
advantage of using larger K’s. Let us now present this
in more detail.
The security parameter.— The first SDI random num-
ber generation protocol [14] was based on a communica-
tion game in which Alice’s input is two bits z = (a0, a1)
and Bob’s input is a single bit y. Alice may communi-
cate a two-level quantum system to Bob who aims to
access the bit ay i.e. the security parameter is T =
1
8
∑
a0,a1,y
P (B = ay|Z = (a0, a1), Y = y). This task
is known as a quantum random access code [24].
The quantum random access code can be generalized
to a multi-dimensional scenario: Alice’s input numbers
a0 and a1 can attain values from 0 to d−1, and she com-
municates a d-level quantum system to Bob who aims to
find B = ay [25]. In this work, we consider the partic-
ular instance of the multi-dimensional quantum random
access code with d = 4, the efficiency (T ) of which will
serve as our security parameter;
T =
1
32
∑
a0,a1,y
P (B = ay|Z = (a0, a1), Y = y). (3)
Main results.— We have applied the methods of Ref.
[20] to evaluate the amount of randomness generated by
the family of protocols based on the d = 4 quantum ran-
dom access code for different values of K. We have used
a standard desktop computer on which a single optimiza-
tion takes about 5 minutes. For arbitrary K, using stan-
dard methods, we would need 4K optimizations for certi-
fication which quickly becomes impractical. For instance,
K = 4 would amount to roughly 21 hours of computing
for a single point on the highest line in fig.1, if it was
not the case that we came up with a method to reduce
the computational complexity of the optimization. To
achieve a reduction of computational complexity, we have
exploited the properties of min-entropy and random ac-
cess codes. The former depends only on the largest value
of probability distribution while the latter effectively only
distinguishes between B = ay and B 6= ay. Therefore, we
have introduced a new binary variable B′ = if(B = ay)
which takes the value 0 only when B = ay, and 1 other-
wise. Because B′ is obtained from B by classical post-
processing, the randomness of B′ is at most equal to that
of B. Whether we do observe losses in entropy while
moving from B to B′ depends on the value of T . In the
regime of large T ’s, which is the one we are interested in,
this will not happen. This is because the most probable
value of B is going to be the one for which the guess is
successful (i.e. B = ay and B
′ = 0) and min-entropy de-
pends only on the highest probability in the distribution.
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FIG. 1: A lower bound on min-entropy is given for different
values of K. Note that for maximal quantum value of T the
same amount of min-entropy is obtained. This amount is 0.4
which is much larger than 0.23 observed for a protocol based
d = 2 quantum random access code in [15]. This is one of the
advantages of using quantum systems with a larger Hilbert
space for communication [25].
If, for at least one of Alice’s inputs, the most probable
outcome of Bob would be different then the success prob-
ability would be lower than Tcrit =
15
16
3
4 +
1
16
1
4 ≈ 0.72.
For larger values of T we are sure that our method does
not lead to the decrease of entropy. Our numerics suggest
that the same happens for lower values.
The main advantage of using B′ instead of B is that
the former takes only two values and the number of opti-
mizations needed to lower-bound the entropy is therefore
2K . Observe that this number of optimizations would re-
main unchanged even if we were to consider a quantum
random access code of much higher dimension than d = 4.
In fig.1 we have plotted the optimization results for
different values of K as a function of the security pa-
rameter T . We observe that for larger K, not only more
randomness is certified but also the critical value of T ,
below which randomness is no longer certified, is lower.
To see how our analysis is relevant to the real exper-
imental scenario we have performed an experimental re-
alization of the quantum random access code with d = 4
which we describe below.
The experiment.— We have implemented the security
parameter estimation for a class of randomness gener-
ation protocols based on the d = 4 quantum random
access code studied in [25]. The physical systems are de-
fined by path and polarisation of single photons. The
information is encoded in four basis states: |1〉 ≡ |H, a〉,
|2〉 ≡ |V, a〉, |3〉 ≡ |H, b〉 and |0〉 ≡ |V, b〉, where (H)
and (V ) are horizontal and vertical polarization photonic
modes respectively, and (a and b) are two spatial modes
of single photons. Any ququart state can be written as
a|H,A〉 + b|V,A〉 + c|H,B〉 + d|H,B〉. We have used a
heralded, single photon source. The photons were gener-
ated through a spontaneous parametric down-conversion
FIG. 2: Experimental set-up for the estimation of the security
parameter T . Alice’s quantum states are prepared through
a combination of three suitably oriented half-wave plates,
HWP(θ1), HWP(θ2) and HWP(θ3), a polarization beam split-
ter (PBS) and a phase shifter PS(φ). Two mirrors M are used
to realize Bob’s choice of measurement basis. Detectors DZi
are associated to the i’th outcome of measurement Z and
similarly for DXi.
(SPDC) process where the idler photon is used as trig-
ger. The emitted signal photon modes are coupled into a
single mode fiber (SMF) and passed through both a nar-
rowband interference filter (F) and a polarizer oriented to
horizontal polarization direction. Alice can produce any
of the 16 states required by the protocol |ψa0a1〉 with
a0, a1 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} by suitably oriented half-wave plates
HWP(θ1), HWP(θ2) and HWP(θ3), polarization beam
splitter (PBS), and a setting of a phase shifter PS(φ).
Bob chooses between two measurement settings. The
choice to measure in a particular basis is implemented
by moving the mirrors (M) in and out with help of pico
motor translation stages. For the computational basis
(Z), the two removable mirrors are not present and the
signal from detectors DZi correspond to measurement
outcome i. For the measurements in the Fourier basis
(X) the mirrors are in place and the two spatial modes
interfere at BS. In this case the measurement outcome i
corresponds to the signal from detector DXi.
Our single-photon detectors, both for trigger and mea-
surements, were silicon avalanche photodiodes with de-
tection efficiency ηd = 0.55. All coincidence counts be-
tween the signal and idler photons were registered using
a multi-channel coincidence logic with a time window of
1.7 ns. The measurement time used for each experimen-
tal setting was 10 s and the number of detected photons
was approximately 2500 per second.
The results we observed are in very good agreement
with the predictions of quantum mechanics. We have
observed T = 0.7347, while the maximum that can be
obtained with quantum resources is T = 0.75.
The results.— We have used T = 0.7347 for the es-
5K Pav(B
′ = 0) Hav∞ time taken
1 1 0 c.a. 10 min.
2 1 0 c.a. 20 min.
3 0.99512 0.007058 c.a. 40 min.
4 0.98180 0.026499 c.a. 1.5h.
5 0.96882 0.045699 c.a. 2.5h.
6 0.95565 0.065446 c.a. 5h.
7 0.94628 0.079661 c.a. 11h.
TABLE I: Amount of randomness generated for different K
from the experimentally obtained value of the security param-
eter using optimized method. In the last column the time it
took us to perform the numerics is given, which reflects the
increased complexity of larger K. It is the one-time cost that
the user has to pay for before running the protocol. Later he
just needs to check if the value of T does not change. If it does
the optimization has to be repeated for the new value. We
estimate that to certify the randomness when all the settings
are used for its generation, i.e. X = X ′ it would take 400.000
years on our machine.
timation of randomness. The results for protocols with
different K are given in table I. Pav(B
′ = 0) is the aver-
age probability that B′ = 0 if the input is from X ′, i.e.
Pav(B
′ = 0) = 1K
∑
x∈X ′ P (B = ay|(a0, a1, y) = x). Hav∞
is equal to − logPav(B′ = 0). First we notice that for the
standard protocol, with K = 1 no randomness is gener-
ated despite the high fidelity of the experiment. How-
ever, the amount of randomness increases quickly with
K. This comes at the price of an increased number of
optimizations. Nevertheless, it is a reasonable one time
cost when we use the device for the first time because it
is likely that later the same (or very similar) value of T
is going to be observed.
Discussion.— We have presented a generalization of
semi-device independent random number generation pro-
tocols to the case in which the randomness is extracted
from more than one choice of inputs. We have shown that
this approach can be used to certify more randomness
without altering the experimental setup. This comes at
a price of much higher requirements on classical compu-
tational power. Furthermore, we have shown how to sig-
nificantly reduce the computational complexity of certifi-
cation. We provided an intuitive explanation of origin of
the advantages of our approach as well as demonstrated it
in practice by performing an experiment and computing
the randomness it generated. Nevertheless, we emphasize
that there is no proof that another randomness certifica-
tion algorithm that performs even better than ours does
not exist. However, our results constitute a significant
advance and indicate the direction which the research on
quantum random number generation is likely to follow.
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